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by Carl S. Carlson Leave a Comment

Understanding FMEA Recommended Actions – Part 2

Understanding FMEA Recommended Actions – Part 2

Problems and Solutions

Consider the recommended action “Review results of XYZ test to confirm requirements are  achieved.” Is this a good FMEA recommended action to address a high-risk issue? Is it sufficient? Challenge your FMEA knowledge by solving this problem and other problems presented in this article.

If you haven’t yet read “Understanding FMEA Recommended Actions – Part 1“, this would be a good time, as it presents fundamental information about design and process recommended actions in an FMEA.

Beginner’s Problem

Which of the following are characteristics of well-written FMEA recommended actions? (Select all that apply)

  1. The name of the person on the FMEA team who recommended the action.
  2. The name of the person who is responsible for execution of the recommended action.
  3. A brief description (no longer than three or four words in length) of what action is to be done.
  4. The date the recommended action was first established.
  5. The date the recommended action needs to be completed.

Beginner’s Solution

Which of the following are characteristics of well-written FMEA recommended actions? (Select all that apply)

  1. The name of the person on the FMEA team who recommended the action. (False. This information is not needed, as the FMEA recommended actions are team approved.)
  2. The name of the person who is responsible for execution of the recommended action. (True)
  3. A brief description (no longer than three or four words in length) of what action is to be done. (False. FMEA recommended actions should be described in sufficient detail to be fully understood even by someone who is not part of the FMEA team.)
  4. The date the recommended action was first established. ((False. This information is not needed. The important date is when the action needs to be completed.)
  5. The date the recommended action needs to be completed. (True)

Intermediate Problem

An FMEA team is considering how to address a high severity and high occurrence issue. Some of the team members want to reduce the severity risk with action strategies such as fail-safe and early warning. Other team members want to significantly reduce the occurrence risk using a robust design strategy. What is the best approach for this team?

Intermediate Solution

It is always a good idea to reduce risk due to high severity, if possible. In addition, risk due to high occurrence should be addressed. The best approach is both of these strategies.

Advanced Problem

Click on the link to view a one-line excerpt from a power steering pump FMEA.

Consider the recommended action “Review results of function test to confirm successful pressure and flow rates achieved.” Is this a good action to address the risk? Is it sufficient? What comments or critiques do you have?

Advanced Solution

The action “Review results of function test to confirm successful pressure and flow rates achieved” is inadequate to address the risk identified in this excerpt for three reasons. First, it is late in the product development process. FMEAs should be completed during the window of opportunity to best impact the design before design freeze date. Second, there is no action to improve the design. The FMEA team identified the cause as “Pressure relief incorrectly identified on the drawing”, with severity 8 and RPN 280. This is relatively high risk and action should have been recommended to specify pressure relief correctly. Third, for high-risk issues there usually needs to be more than one action recommended. In this case, there could be an action to address the incorrect specification, and another action to improve the ability of the bench rig test to detect this problem.

Next Article

A reader is having difficulty seeing the difference between a detection control and a recommended action, and sees them as interchangeable. This has repercussions for the linkage between the Design FMEA and Design Verification Plan, and is the subject of the next FMEA Q and A article.

Filed Under: Articles, Inside FMEA, on Tools & Techniques

About Carl S. Carlson

Carl S. Carlson is a consultant and instructor in the areas of FMEA, reliability program planning and other reliability engineering disciplines, supporting over one hundred clients from a wide cross-section of industries. He has 35 years of experience in reliability testing, engineering, and management positions, including senior consultant with ReliaSoft Corporation, and senior manager for the Advanced Reliability Group at General Motors.

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Articles by Carl Carlson
in the Inside FMEA series

[popup type="" link_text="Logo Info" ]

Information about FMEA Icon

Inside FMEA can be visually represented by a large tree, with roots, a solid trunk, branches, and leaves.

- The roots of the tree represent the philosophy and guiding principles for effective FMEAs.
- The solid trunk of the tree represents the fundamentals for all FMEAs.
- The branches represent the various FMEA applications.
- The leaves represent the valuable outcomes of FMEAs.
- This is intended to convey that each of the various FMEA applications have the same fundamentals and philosophical roots.

 

For example, the roots of the tree can represent following philosophy and guiding principles for effective FMEAs, such as:

1. Correct procedure         2. Lessons learned
3. Trained team                 4. Focus on prevention
5. Integrated with DFR    6. Skilled facilitation
7. Management support

The tree trunk represents the fundamentals of FMEA. All types of FMEA share common fundamentals, and these are essential to successful FMEA applications.

The tree branches can include the different types of FMEAs, including:

1. System FMEA         2. Design FMEA
3. Process FMEA        4. DRBFM
5. Hazard Analysis     6. RCM or Maintenance FMEA
7. Software FMEA      8. Other types of FMEA

The leaves of the tree branches represent individual FMEA projects, with a wide variety of FMEA scopes and results. [/popup]

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